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KANTARAS V. KANTARAS:

How AVICTORY FOR ONE TRANSSEXUAL
MAY HINDER THE SEXUAL MINORITY MOVEMENT
BY ELIZABETH C. BARCENA, J.D., LL.M.

In February of 2003 Judge Gerard O'Brien, a retired judge
from the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, published an 809-page
opinion regarding the custody of Mathew and Irina Kantaras. This
custody proceeding took place in Pasco County, Florida, and
concerned issues not generally considered in most custody cases.
Along with the typically found issues, such as adultery and lying,
the case concerned the sex-reassignment of one parent, as well as
accusations of adoption fraud and invalidity of marriage.
This article will provide a summary of the facts as stated in
the opinion, as well as a discussion of the Court's analysis. Most
notably however, this article's analysis will highlight the
deficiencies of the Kantarasdecision. This analysis will illuminate
the severity of anti-gay sentiment in the judiciary.
The Court's decision to award a transgender custody of his
non-biological children may have been perceived by the gay
community as a huge step for the sexual minority movement.I
However, in reality it may have hindered the rights homosexuals.
Because the Kantaras decision focused its analysis predominantly
on gender identification rather than individual parenting qualities,
child custody laws in Florida will continue to ignore the rights of
homosexual parents. Thus, considering only the rights of parents
that appearto be heterosexual for the sake of comforting the neoconservative, religiously zealous, right-wing fanatics.
SUMMARY OF FACTS LEADING TO CUSTODY HEARING

At birth, Michael Kantaras was biologically, a woman "Margo". 2 But from an early age she felt as though she was a man
1 Gay City News, Vol. 2, Issue 11 (March 14-20, 2003), available at http://
www.gaycitynews.com/gcn21 1/letterstotheeditor.html.
2 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"' Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
availableat http://www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras/docs/birthrecord 1.html.
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trapped inside a female body. 3 In hopes of easing the conflicting
sexual identities she felt, "Margo" underwent sexual reconstructive
surgery. 4 As of the date of this article, Michael had successfully
completed two of the three operations necessary to fully become a
man'.
In 1988, Michael met Linda Forsythe, and within a year
they were married. After a few months, and with Linda's approval,
Michael adopted Mathew, her three-month-old son from a previous
marriage. 5 In 1992, Linda was artificially inseminated with the
donated sperm of Michael's brother;6 Linda gave birth to Irina, but
Michael has yet to legally adopt her.
By 1998, however, their relationship began to deteriorate;
Michael filed divorce papers in September of 1999, and the
following two years consisted of several custody hearings. 7 Yet, in
the midst of all of those custody hearings, and even through the
divorce proceeding, Linda never used Michael's sexuality to gain
leverage in the courtroom. 8 Linda married Michael fully aware of
his past, and remained loyal to the obvious privacy concerns
during their legal disputes.
However, in 2002, Linda changed her strategy for obtaining
custody of Mathew and Irina. 9 Apparently, Michael's petition to
the court for permission to leave Florida with the children
influenced her to use Michael's past as the foundation of her
case. 1° Linda's petition then claimed her marriage to Michael was
void because same-sex marriages are statutorily prohibited in
Florida. 1 She further alleged that Michael's adoption of the two
children was fraudulent since he was, according to Linda's
3id.
41d.
5id.
61d.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6 th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available
at http://www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras/chronology.html.
8aid.
9Id.
7

Id.
" FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (2002)(generally stating, "Marriages between persons
of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction... are not recognized for any
purpose in this state").
1°
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testimony, a gay woman. Accordingly, Florida's prohibition of gay
adoptions would void any legal recognition of his parental rights.
Consequently, their custody battle apparently balanced on
Florida's adamant prohibition of same-sex unions and gay
adoptions. Their marriage may arguably be void from its very
inception because Linda is a woman, and Michael was born a
woman; homosexual unions, of any kind, originating in any13
jurisdiction, are explicitly barred from recognition in Florida.
Linda premised her custody petition completely on Florida's samesex laws; thus, asking the court to find her marriage void, even
though she petitioned for alimony. 14
Furthermore, Linda contended the adoption was fraudulent
and void under Florida law because Florida prohibits same-sex
adoption. 15 Despite her attempt to have Michael's rights voids
from their inception, she asked the court for payments of child
support, a claim she later dropped. 16
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

The majority of the opinion consisted of excerpts from the
court transcript. The Court patiently took great measures to offer
American jurisprudence an insight into the medical world of sexreassignment; an insight that has been lacking from any other case
involving transsexual issues. 17 Undeniably, this offering has
enriched American jurisprudence. However, despite volumes of
expert testimony presented in this case, the custody determination
remains absent of sound legal reasoning or factual support.
Given the complexity of the subject matter involved in this
case, it is important from the outset to clarify the actual opinion
before exploring the legal issues and their implications. The
following sections summarize the testimony presented at trial, i.e.

" FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3)(1997)(stating, "No person eligible
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual).
13 Supra note 10.
14Supra note 6.
15See supra note 11.
16Id.at 803.
17 Supra note 6, at 14.

to adopt under
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the facts relied upon by the Court to reach its final decision and
conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact
1. Linda and Michael
According to the testimony cited in the opinion, Linda and
Michael agree to the following. In 1988 Linda and Michael met at
Albertson's in Holiday, Florida. 18 Michael was living in Cocoa
Beach, Florida, and worked at the Albertson's in Melbourne,
Florida. Linda was living in Palm Bay, Florida with her
boyfriend,
19
John Atkinson, and worked at Albertson's in Holiday.
Additionally, both agree that Michael was present at
2
Mathew's birth, and that he would raise him as "his own". 0
Furthermore, neither party disputes the fact that Linda21knew about
Michael's sex-reassignment before Mathew was born.
2. Facts According to Michael
This section will be used to outline pertinent information
testified to by Michael. There is no assumption on the author's
behalf that any statements are true or even untrue; his testimony is
only being highlighted to provide a gist of the information
provided to the Court in the course of this proceeding.
Michael completed his sex reassignment surgery in 1987
before meeting Linda in 1988. 22 The relationship between Michael
and Linda developed while Linda had a boyfriend, John Atkinson,
and Michael had a girlfriend. 23 Atkinson subsequently moved back
to Michigan, 24 while Michael's girlfriend lived in Texas; 25 during
this time Linda was already pregnant with Atkinson' son Mathew.

18

Supra note 8, at 15, 110.

19 Id.

20 Id. at 20, 128.
21Id. at

16, 126.

22 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.comlarchive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
17.
21 Id. at 15.
24

Id.

25

id.
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Michael accompanied Linda to pre-natal classes, and was
present when Mathew was born. 26 By this time, Linda was already
aware of Michael's sex reassignment because they had become
intimate.27 During this relationship, Linda continued to ask
Michael for assurances that he would raise Mathew as his own
son. 28 In July of 1989 they were married, at which time Mathew
was already six weeks old.
During Mathew's adoption Linda stated, "[Michael] will
always only be Mathew's father and that she would not choose
anyone else to be [his] father." 30 The couple then discussed having
another child through artificial insemination. 31 In 1991 Michael's
brother donated sperm, and in 1992, Irina was born after successful
conception. 32 During this time, and for three years after Irina's
birth, Linda and Michael
mutually agreed that Linda would be a
33
stay-at-home mom.
Around this time, Michael and Linda purchased a home and
obtained a second mortgage together as "husband and wife".34
They also attended a Greek Orthodox Church, and had Irna
baptized, as "husband and wife".35 Linda is also named on
Michael's retirement plan as his wife.3 6 His life insurance policy
lists Mathew and Irina as beneficiaries. 37 Furthermore,
all of
38
Michael's employment records indicate he is "male".
26
27

Id.at

16.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6d' Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available
at http://www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras/hronology.html.
28
Id. at 17.
29 Id.
30

Id. at 18.

31Id.

at 18-19.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
availableat http://www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras/chronology.html.
33Id. at 19-20.
34
Id. at 20.
32

35

Id. at 20-21.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
21.
37
Id.at 21.
36

38

id.
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After purchasing their marital home, Michael alleges that
Linda became materialistic, and expected him to provide luxuries
for the family as "the man he said he wanted to be". 39 In July of
1998, Michael moved out of their home because he began to have
feelings for their neighbor, Sherry Noodwang. 40 During this time,
Michael continued to pay the bills and provide groceries for the
children.41
Between May of 1999 and December of 1999, there were
eight instances where Linda interfered with, or violated Michael's
visitation with the children.42 Also, in June of 1999, Linda chose to
remove the children from counseling, told the children that
Michael did not provide for them financially, and told Mathew that
Michael loved Irina more.43 In November of 1999 Linda told the
children about Michael's surgery. 44 The children began to see a
counselor, and eventually began to understand.45
In 2000, Linda and Michael entered into a mutually agreed
upon visitation schedule, which allowed Michael to visit with the
children in the presence of a therapist. 46 However, between
February 1, 2000 and October 6, 2000, Michael filed seven
Motions for Contempt against Linda, alleging that Linda failed to
attend nine out of ten scheduled counseling sessions, and interfered
with eight visits between Michael and the children.47
In December of 2000, Linda was held in contempt, and was
warned that custody may be transferred to Michael. 48 Around
January of 2001, the visitation order allowed Sherry Noodwang to
39

1Id. at 22.
40 Id. at 222-223.
41 Kantaras v. Kantaras,

No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 61h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf,

at

23.
42

Id. at 24-26.

Id. at 26.
44
45 Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
46 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb.
21, 2003),
43

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf,

28.

Id. at 28-32.
41 Id. at 32.
47

at
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be present during Michael's visits with the children. 49 Also around
that time, Linda began attending Calvary Chapel Worship Center.
She told Calvary that Michael was an evil lesbian, and stated that
Mathew's behavioral problems were God's punishment for
50
sleeping with John Atkinson outside the sanctity of marriage.
2001), Michael had paid a
During this time (between 1998 and
51
support.
child
in
total of $66, 811.27
In January of 2002, the Court began to hear testimony on
this proceeding, which lasted until February 8, 2002.52 In April of
that year, Michael requested an emergency hearing to determine
primary custody of the children. Michael alleged that Linda's
behavior was erratic, bizarre, at times violent towards the children,
and using her religion and Michael's transgender issues to frighten
and alienate them. 53 Michael also requested that she be
psychologically evaluated. 4 Linda was not evaluated, yet Michael
the less,
was awarded primary custody. 55 Linda was, never
56
calls.
phone
frequent
and
visitation
liberal
permitted
In September of 2002, Michael presented several affidavits
regarding Linda's behavior and the children. 57 They include
affidavits from Dr. Boone (the court-appointed psychologist for the
children), Georgetti Lisi (a neighbor), and Susan Spears (a
teacher). They provided the following information for the Court:
Dr. Boone's evaluations concluded that Mathew was
i.
exhibiting behavioral problems when he was angry or
upset, and sought negative attention; he did not feel loved.
Irina would withdraw when she was angry, and tried to
49 Id.
50

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
42-43.
"' Id. at 39.
52

Id. at 32-33.

13

Id. at 33.

54 Id.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
33.
56
55

Id. at

51

33.

Id. at 34.
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exhibit perfect behavior. Finally, Dr. Boone believed that
splitting
the children would be detrimental to their well5
being.
ii.
Georgetti Lisi, their neighbor, stated that Mathew has told
her about Linda hitting and punishing him for no reason.
She noticed that Mathew would 59become angry and agitated
when he was around his mother.
iii.
Susan Spears, a teacher, stated that Linda had sent
messages to Mathew with other children and was trying to
turn other children against Mathew. Mathew also told her
60
that he no longer felt safe around Linda.
Based on this information, the Court ordered Linda to attend
and successfully complete anger management classes, suspended
overnight visits, changed her visits to alternate weekends, and
prohibited
either parent from saying negative things about the
61
other.
3. Facts According to Linda
The Court's conclusions regarding Linda were as follows:
Linda is convinced that Michael is a woman according to their
private lives, and not the public life seen by others; Linda only sees
a woman when Michael is naked; Linda believes the sex
62
reassignment Michael underwent did nothing to change his sex;
Linda believes she misassesed the future her children would face
living with a transsexual parent; 6 3 Linda refuses to admit to any
sexual relations with Michael during their ten-year relationship;
65
Linda insists her relationship in this marriage was a lesbian one;
Linda intentionally disclosed Michael's sex change to the children
58

Id. at 35.

59

Id. at 35.

60 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
36.
61Id. at 36.
62 Id. at 209.
63

id.

64 id.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.con/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
209.
65
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against the opinion of experts; 66 Linda seemed to imply in a private
letter to Michael that she was the "woman who looked at [him] and
saw a man [behind closed doors];",6 7 Linda is resolving her mental
state by referring to Michael as a "living sin" and by turning to her
church; 68 and in the opinion of the Court, Linda "needs counseling
for what appears to be a borderline personality disorder." 69 The
psychiatrist, Dr. Boone, concluded that Linda suffered from a
only a few visits with Linda
borderline personality disorder after
70
children.
the
with
talked
he
while
The courtship between Linda and Michael seems to
coincide without any significant distinctions from Michael's
testimony. 7 1 Linda did reiterate the fact that John Atkinson was
cited as Mathew's father on his birth certificate. 72 When the couple
consulted with an attorney for Mathew's adoption, they did not
disclose Michael's transsexualism. 73 Furthermore, John Atkinson
did not74consent to the adoption of Mathew, nor was his consent
sought.
Linda further stated that she and Michael never engaged in any
type of sexual activity, and they rarely slept in the same bed
together. 75 Linda adamantly denies that Michael has anything
resembling a penis, 76 and therefore finds she is unable to engage in
sexual contact with a woman. 77 Linda also commented that
66Md. at 210.
67 id.
68

69

Id. at 211.
Id. at 776.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
199.
7"Id. at 110-120.
70

72

Id. at 120.

Id. at 130.
In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 749 (Fla. 1989)(ruling that a natural
father's consent is not required if he did not provide pre-natal support for the
mother during her pregnancy; it is seen as abandonment and terminates the
father's rights).
75 Supra note 69, at 131-132.
73
74

76
77

Id. at 134.
Id. at 133.
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Michael was not loving 7or affectionate towards her, and it was
destroying their marriage. 8
On page 136 of the opinion, the Court inserts its own
comments,
and makes an observation
regarding the
"implausibility" of Linda's testimony. It concluded that it was
impossible to believe that Linda never engaged in sexual activity
with Michael, 79 especially because Michael's hormonal treatment
causes an increase in libido.8 0 The Court makes the assumption
that if Michael's sex-drive increased the only logical consequence
would be for Linda to satisfy those urges. Finally, Linda's
assertion that she is81 not gay is rejected because she accepted
Michael in marriage.
During Linda's testimony, the fact that Michael inserts a
sock in his underwear to make it appear as if he has a penis was
only slightly addressed by the Court. 82 Despite Linda's plea for
him to stop this activity, Michael would insert and remove the sock
from his pants in view of the children. 83 Michael did become more
discreet with the sock when Mathew, 84
at the age of five, went to
school one day with a sock in his pants.
Linda's ability to work was restricted by Michael because
he only allowed his mother to baby-sit the children while Linda
worked. 85 However, on January 14, 2002 Linda filed her financial
report with the Court stating a gross monthly income of
$1,001.00. 8' Linda informed the Court that if she were awarded
primary custody of the children and possession of the marital

78 id.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
137.
80 Id. at 136.
8l Id. at 137.
82 Id. at 139.
83 Id.
79

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6' Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
139-140.
85
Id. at 142.
86 Id.
84
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residence,
that she would assume all financial responsibility for the
87
home.
Regarding the care of the children, Linda stated she was
Mathew's primary care giver, and that Michael's work schedule
conflicted with the children's school schedule. 88 On one occasion,
Mathew threw a tantrum after Linda grounded him for
misbehaving in school; she took him to Michael's
house because
89
he was yelling and telling her she was "mean".
A private letter written by Linda to Michael was introduced;
certain portions validate
prior statements made by Linda, which are
90
follows:
as
outlined
i.
"I never told anyone, I am not going to the public" referring to Michael confiding in Sherry by telling her
about his sex change. Linda was expressing this
concern because Sherry had91a child that attended school
with the Kantaras children.
ii.
"Now that you brought this out..." - referring
to
9
reassignment.
sex
his
about
Sherry
Michael telling
iii.
"[B]ut then I saw how much hate you had inside
yourself' - regarding 93the way Michael acted as a result
of not having a penis.
iv.
"[W]hy would you want to be with a woman who wants
to have you as a woman?"
- referring to Michael's
94
Sherry.
with
relationship
v.
"[Y]ou got what I could and would never do for you.
That was be a woman with a woman which was you." 95again, referring to Michael's relationship with Sherry.
87 Id. at

143.

88

Id. at 144.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
145.
9
I1d. at 146.
89

91Id.

92 Id. at 147.
93Id. at 147-148.
94 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
147.
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Michael would become angry and resentful towards Linda
because he was not a man, and would condemn gay men for
having a penis and using it to sleep with other men. 96 It also
bothered Michael that he was unable to urinate in a standing-up
position' because he lacked a penis.97 Incidentally, Mathew urinated
for a long time sitting down instead of standing because he saw
Michael urinating in this matter.98 Furthermore, Michael was
verbally abusive towards Linda, calling her "fat," saying that she
had a "big bottom," her "chest would
sag," or would say "boing,
99
boing, boing" when she walked by.
During their marriage, Michael also told Linda that in order to
make him love her, she had to change her appearance. 1°° She
complied, changing her hair, make-up, and attire.101 Despite these
10 2
changes, Michael's demeanor towards her did not improve.
Finally, Michael confessed to10 Linda
his true feelings for her, as
3
Sherry.
for
feelings
his
as
well
Michael told Linda that he did not love her as a wife, but as
the best friend who always accepted him for who he was. 104 He
went on to say that he loved Sherry as a wife, and that they should
all get married and live as one bi% happy family.0 5 Linda
refused, 0 6 and told Michael to leave.' 0 On one occasion, around
this same time period, Linda was attempting to get the children to

9 Id. at 147.
96
Id. at 150.
97 Id.

98 Id. at 180.

99 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
152.
'o Id. at 153-154.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 154.
103Id. at 155.
th
1o4 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6
Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
155.
'0oId. at 155.
106 Id.
'07 Id. at 157.
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0 8
school while Michael was trying to talk to her about Sherry. 1 9
Linda refused to listen, and said she was going to call the police; 0
Michael told the children, "mommy is going to 1take me to jail."' 110
The children began to cry and pull Linda's hair.' '
When the Court asked about the contempt of court charges,
Linda said she learned from her mistakes, and if Michael were
found to be a male, and the father of her children, she would abide
by the visitation schedule.1 12 She further said she would allow the
children to see Michael more often if theY chose because they were
now old enough to make such decisions.
On November 5, 1999, the children overheard Linda referring
to Michael as "she" while talking to the Shoemakers. 1 4 That same
week, Linda left an urgent message for Dr. Dies, the independent,
court-appointed therapist," 5 informing him that people at the
children's school knew about 11Michael's
sex change, and that
6
Mathew was being called "gay.
The same week of November 5 th, the children's principal, Mr.
Shafchuk, told Linda that rumors regarding Michael's sex change
were circulating; she told him that she did not want the children to
know, and that she had not spoken to anyone about this." 7 Once
Linda spoke with Dr. Dies, he advised her to tell the children in 18a
loving manner, which she did once they arrived from school.'
Linda chose not to invite Michael over when she told the children
because she had warned him about not telling anyone because it

108
109

Id. at 169.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.con/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
169.
11oId. at 169.
...
Id. at 169-170.
112 Id. at 158.
113Id. at 158.
114 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6 h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.con/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
158, 213,219.
"' Id. at 420.
116Id. at 158.

Id. at 159.
' Id. at 159-160.

117

18
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would devastate the children if they ever learned of his operation.
Furthermore, Dr. Dies did not suggest that Michael be present, nor
did he criticize the way she disclosed the information to the
children. 119
When Sherry, Linda and Michael sat down together to discuss
the situation, Michael once again presented Linda with the option
of remaining married to her, but marrying Sherry as well. 120 He
wanted to be married to Linda as a best friend, but married 122
to
12 1
was.
she
who
not
that's
saying
Sherry as a wife. Linda refused
4. Medical Opinions Summarized
The medical opinions offered at the Kantaras trial were
undeniably extensive, and despite the wealth of information it
provides to our judicial system, it is not relevant to this paper.
Therefore, the medical opinions of the doctors, Dr. Bockting, Dr.
Huang, and Dr. Collier, will only be summarized briefly.
Dr. Bockting, PhD, a clinical psychologist, defined
transsexualism as a "gender identity disorder...and [it] is defined
as having an intense discomfort with one's sex and gender
assignment at birth, and... a preoccupation with obtaining the sex
characteristics of the opposite sex.
Dr. Bockting explained the
sex reassignment process as three-fold: first, there is hormone
therapy, second is the real life experience, and finally, the sexual
reassignment surgery. 124 However, it is important to note that he
has never had any personal contact with the
Kantaras family; his
125
opinions at this trial were general in nature.
He went on to define the ethical standards that
professionals should follow when working with a transsexual
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
166-168.
120 Id. at 176.
121 id.
119

122 Id.
123

Id. at 268.

124Kantaras

h
v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"
Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
271.
125 Id. at 297.
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individual. 126 Part of the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care
instructs professionals to refer a transsexual client to specialists in
the field of transsexualism, and further suggests that female to
male transsexuals should remain on hormone treatment to prevent
depression and aggressive mood-swings from setting in.127
Dr. Bockting stated that a female to male transsexual, who
128
completes the process, is not a lesbian, but a heterosexual.
Further, if a female to male transsexual, after the operation is
complete, is sexually attracted to men and women, then "he" is a
bisexual. 129 Dr. Bockting concluded by saying that30 a female to
male transsexual should be considered legally male. 1
When asked how society reacted to a transsexual's
transformation, Dr. Bockting replied, "[At the] beginning there
is.. .a grieving process. It might be denial. Then there might be
anger. There are fears, 'what are the neighbors going
to think?' But
' 31
eventually.. .they arrive at a level of acceptance."'
Dr. Bockting went on to say that children of a transsexual
parent may be affected by learning that a parent was in fact born of
the sex opposite of the one they now possess, he replied as follows:
"Well, I think it would be devastating. I would be very concerned
about it. And I do believe that children are resilient - they usually
do understand. But, I think they'll - - have great emotion turmoil
over this - - especially if they are at that time when they need to be

proud of their Dads. It can be really tough. It's not a good
thing."'13 1 Dr. Bockting went on to say that it could potentially
"cause psychological or emotional harm to the children."' 33
However, Dr. Bockting did emphasize that living with a
transsexual parent does not harm children, so long as it is a "good
Id. at 299.
Id. at 299-300.
28
1 Id. at 292.
129 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct.
Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
293.
130
126

127

Id. at 296.
131 Id. at 273.
132
133

Id. at 287.
Id.
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parent". 134 It further seems that a female to male transsexual does
not lose her natural, "mother instinct,"1 35 yet possesses the
masculine characteristics needed for "male-bonding" to occur with
a son. 136 Dr. Bockting, on cross-examination, admitted that he had
only worked with three or four families in a situation similar to the
Kantaras' situation where
the transsexualism came out during a
37
1
proceeding.
divorce
Dr. Ted Huang is a plastic surgeon that performs sex
reassignment for transsexuals. 13 8 His testimony falls outside the
scope of this paper because he explained the steps and procedures
to follow when performing sexual reassignment. However, this
explanation can be found in the opinion between pages 313 and
343.
Dr. Collier Cole, PhD., is a clinical psychologist working
with individuals in the area of sexual dysfunctions. 139 Most of his
testimony reiterated the statements made by Dr. Bockting, and can
be found on pages 344 to 419. However, one comment deserves
mentioning.
Dr. Cole stated that transsexuals engage in heterosexual sex
because they are suffering from a gender identity disorder;
homosexuals, on the other hand, are dealing with a sexual
orientation issue. 14° Gender identity is more concerned with
141
anatomy, whereas homosexuality focuses more on sexual roles.
He went on to say that Michael has the identity of a man, and like
most men, is attracted to women, thus, making him
42
heterosexual. 1
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6kh Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
294.
"'
Id. at 294.
136 Id. at 310-311.
137 Id. at 298.
138 Id. at 313-316.
139 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6t' Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
344.
'40 Id. at 350.
141 Id.
142 Id.
134
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Dr. Dies, as previously stated, was the independent courtappointed therapist to evaluate the Kantaras family; his
consultations with the family spanned from April of 1999 to April
of 2001.143 His experience with transsexual parenting, however, is
limited to this specific case. 144 His testimony is extremely relevant,
and will therefore be highlighted in more detail.
Dr. Dies evaluated Linda and Michael against ten of
Florida's thirteen custody criteria, 145 and concluded that Michael
should have primary care of the children. 146 Dr. Dies further
concluded that removing the children from Michael's life
completely would be devastating. 147 The following outline
highlights Florida's "best interest" statute, along with summaries
from Dr. Dies, and the Court's conclusions regarding each factor.
Florida Statute 61.13(3) states, for purposes of shared
parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of
the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the
welfare and interests of the child, including, but not limited to:
a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent
and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent.
" Here, Dr. Dies found Michael would be more
cooperative. 148
" The Court also concluded that Michael would best
49
meet this criterion. 1
b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parents and the child.
• Dr. Dies did not directly answer this question,
or
150
provide an opinion favoring either parent.
Id. at 422.
144 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
454.
145 Id. at 422-423; FL STAT § 61.13 (West 1997).
146 Id. at 514.
147 Id. at 516.
14 8 Id. at 423-426.
149 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
785.
150 Id. at 420-517.
141
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Under this factor, both Linda and151 Michael were
found by the Court to score evenly.
c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial
care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state
in lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
" Dr. Dies did not address this factor in detail.' 52
" However, the Court concluded that Michael best
met this criterion because Linda's financial
1 53
contribution has been "less than significant."'
d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity.
" This information was also
not sufficiently explored
54
*

in Dr. Dies' testimony. 1

*

The Court favored both Linda
and Michael equally
55
under this consideration. 1

e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home.
156
* Dr Dies did not address this criterion.
f) The moral fitness of the parents.
* Dr. Dies considered the moral fitness of the parents
in "terms of some of the traditional ways we look at
morality, criminal record, abuse of the children,
physically or sexually, drug or alcohol abuse" he
considered neither parent as immoral. 157
" The Court found Linda's morality questionable
because she has been prone to violate court orders
regarding Michael's visitation, as well as inclined to
152

I5l
Id.
at 785.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 786.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6t' Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
460.
1'Id. at 786.
116
Id.at 420-517.
117 Id. at 427, 786.
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distort the truth. 158 Therefore,
the Court favored
159
Michael in this category.
g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
" Dr. Dies did not provide a direct response to this
factor.160
* Based on "information gathered from many
different sources," the Court concluded she is
overly moralistic, conventional, holds little insight
into her own motivation, and is unaware of the
consequences to other people of her behavior.16
However, the Court did state that neither parent was
seriously maladjusted. 162 Yet, it concluded that
Michael's mental health was better than Linda's. 163
h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
* Dr. Dies did not review school records; therefore,
he did not provide an opinion regarding this
factor. 16
" The court concluded that Michael was favored here
because Linda had moved the children from several
schools without Michael's knowledge, and believed
Michael had a more positive interest in the
165
children's schooling.
i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and
experience to express a preference.

158 Id. at

786.
Kantaras v. Kantaras , No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
786.
'60 Id. at 420-517.
159

161 Id. at
162

786-787.

Id. at 787.

163 Id.

4Id. at 460.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6t' Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

165

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
788.
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*

Dr. Dies stated that the children preferred living
with their mother; but warned that such a desire
efforts to alienate the
may be a result of Linda's
66
1
Michael.
from
children
* The Court did not disclose the preference made by
the children in confidence. 67 However, he did
68 state
that Linda had "brain-washed" the children.1
j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship
between the child and the other parent.
" This criterion is very similar to the first one, which
focuses on the parent more likely to allow frequent
and continuing contact between the other parent and
the children. 16 9 Dr. Dies also stated that Linda was
alienating the children from Michael by telling them
negative things about him. 7 °
* Dr. Dies further stated that Linda's new religious
attitude was alienating the children from Michael
Michael's
even
further. 1'
Specifically,
1 72
transsexualism categorizes him as a sinner.
• The Court found "no doubt...that Linda suffers
from the parental alienating syndrome."' 173 He
further noted that the evidence presented "raises
her suffering a Borderline Personality
concerns for
' 174
Disorder."

66

Id. at 442.

167

Id. at 789.

168 Id. at 788-789.
169 Id. at 423-426.
170 Kantaras v. Kantaras,

No. 98-5375CA (Fla.

6 th

Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras/chronology.html,
443.
171Id. at 512.
172 id.

173

Id. at 790.

174 Id.

at 440-
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* The Court therefore favored Michael.175
k) Evidence that any party has knowingly provided false
information to the court regarding a domestic violence
proceeding.
* This factor was not addressed.
1) Evidence of domestic violence or child abuse.
* This factor was not addressed.
m) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant.
* The Court did not address any other facts cited in
the record.
Dr. Dies also provided the Court with excerpts from an
interview he conducted with Linda's brother-in-law, "Uncle
Billy". 176 During that interview, Uncle Billy referred to Michael as
"it" and as "she" or "Margo". 177 Dr. Dies also explained how
Linda's family did not think that Sherry was "nice;" yet, they
described Linda's new significant other with positivism. 178 Dr.
Dies does not seem to Provide any information regarding
Michael's extended family.
Additionally, Dr. Dies concluded that Linda had a negative
view of Michael's parenting abilities. 18 Namely, she found
Michael in poor physical and mental health, potentially violent and
suicidal. 18 1 Dr. Dies, however, did not find Michael to possess any
of those characteristics during their sessions. 82
Dr. Dies also stated that Mr. Kantaras was of the opinion
that Linda had revealed Michael's sexual reassignment to members
of the community. 183 When asked about gender identity being
175

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6 h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
790.
116 Id. at 429.
177 Id. at 429-30.
178

Id. at 430.

See id. at 421-518.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
433-434.
81
' d. at 434.
82
'

180

1

83

Id.

' Id. at 438.
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classified as a mental disorder, Dr. Dies confirmed it was listed in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychological Association as a mental disorder; 184 yet, he did
not
85
perceive Michael to have a mental disorder, rather a "label."'
Addressing the "sock-stuffing" previously mentioned, Dr.
Dies was never made aware of Michael's routine, nor did he know
that Mathew imitated this behavior. 186 Therefore, Dr. Dies never
addressed these issues in his sessions with Mathew. The sessions
did, however, provide Dr. Dies with enough information to find
Mathew "very angry and distressed... with significant problems in
self-esteem, depression, conflicts in social relationships,
difficulties with impulse control, limited resources for coping with
stress, poor information processing, and major problems in both
perceiving and adequately reasoning realistically. ' 87 Dr. Dies
confidently concluded that these problems were not simply a result
of Michael's sock stuffing, 188
but were attributable to long-standing
family.
the
within
problems
5. Testimony From Michael's Witnesses Summarized
John Kantaras, Michael's father, stated he had provided
groceries for the children after Michael left. 189 Irene Kantaras,
Michael's
mother, described Michael's childhood as a typical
"boy". 19° That is, Margo acted like a boy and engaged in "boylike" activities.
Monica Jordan, a mutual friend of Linda and Michael,
testified about Linda's reaction to Michael's relationship with
Sherry. 191 She also told the Court that Linda had discussed how she
"4Id.at

451.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trialskantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
478.
186
Id. at 455.
187
Id. at 456.
18 8 Id. at 457.
189 Id. at 62.
190 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
185

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trialskantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
63-66.
"9 Id. at 67-75.
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had sex with Michael. 19 2 Pamela Thomas, Sherry's sister, testified
about Linda's animosity towards Sherry. 193 Sherry Noodwang
explained how her relationship with Michael
developed, and how
94
Linda's friendship with her deteriorated. 1
Carol Ciembronowicz, a friend of the Kantaras family,
provided the Court with her observations of the family. 195 Namely,
Carol stated that Linda would discipline Mathew by hitting him,
whereas Michael would talk to him. 196 The other witnesses
presented by Michael, Diana Lee Barber, Jane Blanton, Cathy
Williams, Denise White and Gail Myers did not provide testimony
pertinent to this paper, and reiterated information already provided.
6. Testimony From Linda's Witnesses Summarized
Crystal Shoemaker, Linda's sister, told the Court that
Michael did not allow Linda to drive after 4:00 PM, and that he
was very controlling Crystal also told the Court about the night
Linda explained Michael's sexuality to the children. 197 William
Shoemaker, Crystal's husband, reiterated the events 1as
they
98
transpired the night Linda told the children about Michael.
Cathy Williams, Linda's friend from church, described
Linda as a playful and caring mother. 199 Cindy Daily, 200 Sylvie
Harrison, 20 1 Dana Brussow,202 and John Shafchuk, 2°3 are all
associated with the children's education, and attest to Linda's

192

Id. at 76-7.

'9' Id. at 60.
194 See id. at 81-95.
'95 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
98.
196 Id. at 98-99.
97
1 Id. at 213-216.
198 Id. at 223-225.
199 Id. at 227.
h
200 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla.
6t Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
229.
201 Id. at 230.
202 Id. at 247.
203 Id. at 249-251.
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parenting skills. Pastor Rebecca J. Baker stated Linda has been a
good parent, 20420and refused to accept Michael as a male.2 °5
Ronald Noodwang, 206 Maria Cuatt, 207 and Allison Hoskins
20 8
did not contribute any more information relevant to this paper,
and again, reiterated testimony already stated elsewhere. This
concludes the testimony of all witnesses.
The next section of the Court's opinion refers to summaries
of law as they relate to transsexualism. The first issue addressed is
the Medical History of Transsexualism; this is not particularly
important to an understanding of the topics discussed in this
paper. 20 9 The Court proceeds to provide information that is not of
significance to this comment which include: Foreign
Jurisdictions, 21° Transsexualism in the Orient, 211 Australian
Law, 212 Academia's Response, 213 and International Medical
Journals; 214 therefore, they will not be discussed in this paper.
SUMMARY OF CASE LAW CITED

The information cited by the Court that is pertinent to this
note includes: English Jurisprudence, 21 Texas Law,"' Florida

204
205

Id. at 242.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
245.
206 Id. at 232-37.
207 Id. at 246.
208 Id. at 248.
209 Id. at 519-34.
2 0 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. th
6 Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
560-585.
211 Id. at 586-591.
212 Id. at 674-707.
213 Id. at 729-750.
214 Id. at 751-773.
215 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available
at
http://
http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at 535-559.
216 Id. at 592-610.
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2
Law, 217 and Kansas Law. 218
8 Each of these sections will now be
summarized for a cursory review of the material.

English Jurisprudence
The Corbett case was the first case to consider the issue of
transsexuality. 219 In this decision, Judge Ormrod, who presided
over the matter, stated, "It is important to note that [the following]
criteria have been evolved by doctors for the purpose of
systematizing medical knowledge, and assisting in the difficult
task of deciding the best way of managing the unfortunate patients
who suffer, either physically or psychologically, from sexual
abnormalities: 1) Chromosomal factors; 2) Gonadal factors; 3)
Genital factors; 4) Psychological factors; 5) Hormonal factors.
These five criteria are of course, relevant to, but do not necessarily
decide the legal basis of sex determination." 22° Judge Ormrod
concluded that a transsexual is not a [member of the new assigned
sex] for the purposes of marriage but continues to be the biological
sex assigned at birth.22'
Texas Law
In the Littleton case the Fourth District Court of Appeals in
Texas resolved a matter concerning a surviving spouse (Littleton, a
male to female transsexual) suing a doctor for the wrongful death
of her husband. 222 After reviewing applicable case law, the Fourth
District Court of Appeals noted the lack of precedent regarding
23
transsexual marriages. 22
It then proceeded to consider case law
most similar to transsexualism, same-sex marriages,224 and realized
211

Id.at 611-626.

218

Id. at 627-673.
Id. at 559 (citing Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306, All E.R. 33

219

(P.D.A. 1970)).
h
220 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"
Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available
at
http://
http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at 547.
221 Id. at 557.
222 Id. at 592 (citing Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999)).
223 Id. at 596.
224 Id. at 597.
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that society may be prone to simply classifying a transsexual
225
marriage as a homosexual one.
After careful review, the Court concluded "it would be
intellectually impossible for [a] court to write a protocol for when
transsexuals would be recognized as having successfully changed
their sex. ' 226 It refused to "make law when no law exists: [they]
can only interpret the written work of [their] sister branch of
government, the legislature." 227 Therefore, the Appellate Court
ruled Littleton was still legally male, as such, was statutorily
barred from marrying another man. The marriage was
consequently
voided, and denied her the right to sue as a surviving
22 8
spouse.

Florida Law
A Florida Administrative Decision ruled that gender
dysphoria is a handicap, and prohibited the City of Jacksonville
from terminating employment on account of sexual
reassignment. 229 Florida does not have any other case law
regarding transsexual issues.
Kansas Law
In the Matter of the Estate of Marshall J. Gardiner, the
Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the Littleton decision, and
found that the legislature's silence on transsexuals as indicative of
barring them from marriage.2 3 0 The Supreme Court further relied
on Kansas' strong public policy of recognizing only marriages

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
225

598.
226 Id. at 604.
227 Id. at 605.
228

Id. at 605.

Id. at 611 (citing Smith v. City of Jacksonville Correctional Institution,
Administrative Case Hearing No: 88-5451, Oct. 2, 1991)).
230 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct.
Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
660 (citing In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. App. 2001)).
229
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231

between one man and one woman as valid.
In the Supreme
Court's opinion, the legislative intent232to prohibit transsexual
marriages was found to be unambiguous.
Conclusions of Fact and Law
To summarize, the Court's legal research consisted of:
Foreign Law, the Littleton case from Texas, the Gardiner case
from Kansas, and law review articles, which simply reiterated the
medical opinion of the expert witnesses. 233 After reviewing the
case law just summarized, the Court stated its factual and legal
findings. 234 First, the Court found fifteen states, Florida not
included, that permit birth certificates to be amended after sexual
reassignment.
The Court then gave full faith and credit to Michael's
amended birth certificate, which changed his name from "Margo"
to "Michael" - the sex, however, remained unaltered and identified
Michael as "female." 236 After considering the "traditionalist"
approach (i.e. determining birth by birth certificates), the Court
concluded Michael was male as stated by his amended birth
certificate.237 This reasoning seems misplaced because a
traditionalist view would not have considered an amended birth
certificate; traditionalism uses the sex determined at birth. Yet, the
Court stated that Ohio erroneously left Michael's sex as "female"
after changing "Margo" to "Michael". 238 However, this conclusion
was not accurately based on Ohio law.
The Court either incorrectly assumed that Ohio made a
mistake in leaving Michael's sex as "female," or Michael
misinformed the Court by telling him that Ohio had simply
231

Id. at 659 (citing the legislative history of KSA 23-101, 1996)(amending

marriage to be defined as a civil union between a man and a woman)).
232

Id. at 660.

233

Id. at 729-750.

234 Id.
235

at 761-773.
Id. at 763.

236

Id. at 762.

237 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21,
2003),

available at http://www.courttv.cornarchive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
762.
238

Id. at 762.
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forgotten to change his sex to "male" when they changed his name
to "Michael". Undeniably, birth certificates in Ohio are not
amended after a sex change; in fact, they can only be amended if
an error occurred at the time of designation, that is, if the239
original
entry, at the time that it was entered, was in fact a mistake.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has previously
considered a petition from a transsexual to have the birth certificate
and school records amended from "female" to "male". 240 The
Court emphatically stated, "it was the intent of the legislature of
Ohio that a birth certificate is an historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.",24 1 Therefore, Michael's birth
certificate did not erroneously retain "female" - it deliberately
stated "female" because Ohio does not alter birth certificates after
the reassignment of sex.
The Court then proceeds to discuss the children, and the
detrimental consequences to be suffered by them if Michael is not
found to be their legal father. 24 2 Those consequences include: the
right of inheritance, medical coverage, and loss of life insurance
benefits from Michael's life insurance policy. 243 Also addressed is
Linda's "meager income" which may require her to seek public
assistance without Michael's support. 244
The Court concludes its opinion with a section titled
"conclusions of law" - most of which are excerpts from Linda's
and Michael's pleadings and testimony. The conclusions cited by
the Court most applicable to this paper are as follows:
1. "The eligibility to marry is confined to mature adults who
must present themselves visibly as of the male and female
gender to the County Court Judge or Clerk of the Circuit
Court before the license to marry shall be issued. 245
In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio P.C. 1987).
Id. (quoting K. v. Health Division, 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ohio 1977)).
241 Id.
239
240
242

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6t ' Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.comlarchive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf,
771-773.
243

Id. at 772.

244

Id. at 772-773.

245

Id. at 794.

at
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2. "There is no statutory requirement that the applicants shall
prove their gender by producing a birth certificate at the
' 246
time of their application."
3. "The gender or sex of a person at birth as evidenced by a
birth certificate may be relevant but is not by law
dispositive. There is a presumption of correctness for most
purposes, but it is 247
a rebuttable presumption in the face of
evidence."
medical
4. "For the purposes of ascertaining the legal validity of a
marriage between two adults of the opposite gender the
question whether a person is a man or woman should be
determined as of the date of the application for the license
because that is
the critical time,. and not later than the date
24 8
of marriage."

5. "There is no rule of law or medical basis that requires the
circumstances at the time of birth to be the sole factor to
determine qualification for a license to marry because there
are so many medical variables between birth and a fully
grown adult over some 18 years and its on adults the
obligation of marriage is placed,
particularly, if there are to
249
be children of the marriage.
6. "Chromosomes are only one factor in the determination of
sex and they do not overrule gender or self-identity, which
is the true test or identifying mark of sex. Michael has
250
always, for a lifetime, had a self-identity of a male."
7. "Under the marriage statute of Florida, Michael is deemed
to be male, and the marriage ceremony performed in the
Sandford County Court house on July 18, 1989, was
251
legal.",

Id.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
794.
248 Id. at 795.
246

247

249 Id.

250
251

Id. at 796.
Id. at 797.
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FINAL JUDGMENT

Among the 23 paragraphs listed in the Final Judgment, only
six are relevant to this paper; they are explained as follows:
After reviewing the pleading, evidence in the record, expert
testimony, general witnesses, and Florida's marriage statute, the
Court concluded "the overwhelming evidence favor[ed] declaring
into on July 18, 1989, at Sanford,
the marriage valid as entered
252
Seminole County, Florida.
Of most significance to this paper was the Court's
conclusion regarding the adoption of Mathew and artificial
insemination of Irina. The judge concluded "[t]he adoption was the
inducement to the marriage, in order to...make [Mathew]
legitimate in the eyes of the law. The marriage being valid, despite
the position of Linda Kantaras, whose legal position withdraws the
mantle of legitimacy from her own children, is declared legal. 253
"The daughter, Irina L. Kantaras, was conceived by
artificial insemination with Michael's brother, Thomas, being the
sperm donor. The birth certificate reflects the marriage status of
Michael and his legal position as husband to Linda Kantaras.
Similarly to Mathew, if Michael Kantaras as husband is declared
invalid then Irina's birth certificate and Mathew's birth certificate
listing parents would be in error, Irina would have no father and
be conceived out of wedlock and not legitimate at
she would
4
law."

25

"The consequential calamities are avoided through having
Michael Kantaras legally husband of Linda Kantaras and the father
of Irina. The birth of Irna is declared legal and legitimate within
the law. The adoption of Mathew is declared legal and legitimate
within the law." 255 It was further concluded that Linda and Michael
share parental responsibilities, but primary custody was accorded
to Michael.256
252

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at.http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
806 - 807.
253 Id. at 807.
254 Id.
255

id.

256/d. at 799.
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UNANSWERED LEGAL QUESTIONS

More than 400 pages of the Court's opinion focused on
determining Michael's sex, and on the legalities of sexreassignment. 257 While such an inquiry may assist in establishing a
new definition of sex, it offers nothing to the determination of the
children's best interest, or if Florida is even statutorily prepared to
admit such a definition of sex. The Court's dedication to the issue
of Michael's sex, while groundbreaking, left many questions
unanswered; namely, were the best interests of the children
adequately evaluated before granting Michael primary custody,
and was Florida law accurately considered when making this
determination.
In order to answer these two fundamental questions, it is
necessary to step back and look at this case from a different
perspective. What if the Court's in-depth quest into the world of
transsexualism leads him to conclude that Michael was still legally
female? Would Michael even have the possibility of seeking
primary custody, or visitation with the children if he was
determined to be female? Is Linda sufficiently unfit to qualify
Michael as primary custodian under a third-party review, thus
justifying removal of the children from their natural birth mother?
This paper will focus on the actual custody aspect of this
case in order to determine if the Court's custody determination is
legally sound. Before proceeding to the heart of this paper, an
understanding of Florida's same-sex marriage laws should be
discussed. While homosexuality involves a relationship between
two individuals of the same "visibly-apparent" sex, 258 a transsexual
relationship, consists of two individuals who, at the time of birth,
were of the same sex, but now259appear to the unsuspecting public as
members of the opposite sex.

257 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.conarchive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at

264 - 419; 519 -707; 717 -773.
258 Id. at 719.
259 See generally M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210-211 (NJ App. Div.
1976)(defining transsexualism as "a disparity between [a person's] genitalia or
anatomical sex and his or her gender, that is, the individual's strong and
consistent emotional and psychological sense of sexual being).
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This analysis is at the core of this case because the Court's
opinion, as do other cases involving transsexual relationships,
draws a clear distinguishing line between gay couples and
heterosexuals. 26 Florida's explicit discrimination against the
marriage rights and adoption privileges of same-sex couples
suggests a goal of retaining traditional family values. 26 1 Further,
traditional means of identifying sex have always been at birth,262
and any modification to this tradition requires more legal substance
than reliance on medical opinion alone.
By understanding Florida's same-sex laws, it becomes
evident that Florida law has not evolved sufficiently to warrant the
legal recognition of a transsexual marriage. Hence, the Court's
decision to validate the Kantaras marriage lacks sound legal
support. Without this legal foundation, it cannot be said with
certainty that Michael's marriage to Linda is valid. This
understanding is crucial to the custody issues discussed in this
paper because the Court premised its custody determination almost
entirely on the validity of the Kantaras marriage. Therefore, if the
marriage is invalid, Michael's position as a parent in a custody
dispute diminishes to third-party status. For these reasons, the
following section summarizes Florida's same-sex laws to
demonstrate why Florida law is likely to resist the legal recognition
of a transsexual marriage.
WOULD FLORIDA LAW CONSIDER MICHAEL'S MARRIAGE TO
LINDA VALID?

Because Florida courts have never reviewed any cases
involving transsexual marriages, the only guidance would come
from reviewing cases regarding Florida's position on same-sex
unions. Reviewing such cases provides a general understanding of
Florida's position on couples, relationships, or even people that do
not fit neatly into mainstream society. This analysis should have
been expected in the Court's opinion; the Gardiner decision, as
well as Littleton, relied heavily on reviewing same-sex statutes
260
261
262

See generally M.T. 355 A.2d at 207-208.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 741.01 (1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (1997).
See generally K. v. Health Division, 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ore. 1977).
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[597, 659], and both of those cases involved the validity of a
transsexual marriage.
Same-sex Marriages in Florida
26 3
Florida limits marriages to one man and one woman.
They have also incorporated the Federal Defense of Marriage
Act ("DOMA"), which precludes homosexuals who marry in
other States
from being recognized in Florida as a legal
264
union.
In summary, Florida prohibits any same-sex marriage
entered into in any jurisdiction from being recognized in
Florida.26 Additionally, "For purposes of interpreting any state
statute or rule, the term "marriage" means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
term "spouse" applies only to a member of such a union." 266 In
conclusion, Florida has sustained a "strong
public policy that
267
unit."
family
natural
the
of
favor
in
exists
In the Kantaras opinion, the Court looks to Florida's
Marriage Statute, and defines it as "innocuous" simply because
it does not define male or female. 268 However, he did take
notice of Florida's statute prohibiting same-sex marriages, only
to note the State's reliance on marriages consisting of one male
and one female. 269 The Court further noted Florida's Attorney
General's interpretation of the statute which required Clerks
to
270
refuse marriage license applications from same-sex couples.
The Attorney General's opinion requiring clerks to only
issue marriage licenses to male/female couples cannot be
interpreted to include those men or women or those who look
263 FLA. STAT.

ch. 741.01 (1997).

See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (1997).
265 FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (1) (2002).
2
16 FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (3) (2002).
264

267

In re Guardianship of D. A. McW., 429 So. 2d 699, 703-04 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.

App. 1983); affid, In re Guardianship of D.A.McW, 460 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1984),
Kantaras v. Kantaras , No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.conarchive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
717.
269 Id.
270 Id.

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XII

like members of opposite sex. If such an interpretation were
accurate, then same-sex couples would only have to show up at
the Clerk's office appearing to be heterosexual. Nothing in the
statute or in the Attorney General's opinion suggests 'clerks
should ask for proof of sexual identity. Nothing is required
because the reasonable understanding of one man and one
woman means what any reasonable person thinks it means; one
man born as a man, and one woman born as a woman.
The Court went on to note Broward County's Domestic
Partnership Act (BCPA) which recognizes common law
marriages between same-sex couples. 2 71 When BCPA was
challenged, the Fourth District Court of Appeals in Florida
found the Act did not violate Florida law because such common
law "partnerships
did not rise to the level of a traditional marital
27
relationship."
The Court interpreted all of the evidence previously
cited in this immediate section
~,,273 to mean that "no law expressly
bars transsexuals from being eligible for a license to marry.
He concluded, "[tihe rational approach [to resolving the validity
of Michael's marriage under Florida law], without calling upon
emotional influence or popular opinion of 'the man on the
street' should influence the outcome of this case. 27 4
Florida's statutes clearly limit marriage to one man and
one woman. Simply because the statutes do not specify what is
a man, or if sex is to be determined solely at birth, does not
negate the reasonable interpretation of the text. The Court chose
to interpret Florida's statutes to mean, absent any clear intent to
have it interpreted in such a manner, that sex is determined at
the time the marriage occurs instead of birth.275 Even though
the statutes' silence may be interpreted to mean that sex is
defined at any given time throughout one's life, it could just as
271

272

Id. at 720;

Id.(citing Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d. 1199 (Fla. 4"h D.C.A. 2000)).
h
273 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6" Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
720.
274
Id. at 721.
275 Id. at 720.
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easily be defined to mean strictly at birth. Thus, such an
interpretation seems much more reasonable.
Furthermore, the abundance of medical testimony relied
upon by the Court undeniably confirms the distinction between
sex and gender identity. 276 However, Florida lawmakers
probably lack the expertise to make such distinctions while
drafting legislation. The Court acknowledged the statutes'
silence regarding transsexuals; this silence, combined with the
statutes' silence on gender identity, may better be indicative of
intent to exclude transsexuals from entering into a valid
marriage, than intent to have them included. As will later be
addressed, such statutory silence has traditionally been
interpreted to exclude transsexual marriages instead of implying
their inclusion.
Florida's law prohibiting same-sex marriages, along with
its adoption of DOMA, illustrates a clear intent to retain marriages
between members of the opposite sex. The Court was correct in
stating, "[t]he traditional approach to marriage is the main road
traveled;" 277 sex has "traditionally" been recognized at birth, and
any stray from this tradition does not require explicit statutory
language. For example, same-sex laws were implemented when
"tradition" no longer meant one man and one woman. When gay
couples attempted to benefit from "traditional" heterosexual laws,
legislators quickly developed legislation to block their access, and
reinforce what "tradition" still meant to Florida. The Court did not
validate the Kantaras marriage because Florida law or "tradition"
permitted it; he validated it because the Kantaras' were divorced
before legislators could explicitly bar transsexuals from the
"traditional" meaning of marriage.
Florida's prohibition of same-sex marriages provides strong
support for concluding the Kantaras marriage should not have been
found valid under Florida law. However, it may be worthwhile to
look at some cases from other jurisdictions to determine if
Michael's marriage would have been valid in other States. Given
276 Id. at

796.

277 Id. at 721; see also In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832

(Ohio P.C. 1987).
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the limited amount of cases concerning transsexual marriages, it
will be necessary to review cases on other transsexual issues in
order to illustrate where the United States currently stands on
transsexual issues.
WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF TRANSSEXUAL RECOGNITION
IN THE UNITED STATES?

Birth Certificate Changes
Maryland has implemented a provision in its general health
statute that explicitly permits changes to birth certificates for
transsexuals who have the external genitalia
with the new sex, and
278
the change is permanent and irreversible.
Oregon, however, will not permit changes to birth
certificates because it is the intent of the legislature that "birth
certificates [be] an historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. 279
Ohio further states that "a person's sex in regard to his birth
certificate... [is a legal issue] and, therefore, the court must look to
the statutes. 280 The Court went on to say "that the legislature
should change the statutes if it is to be the public policy of the
State of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post-operative
transsexuals." 281 New York has also rejected petitions from
282
transsexuals seeking to alter their original birth certificates.
Name Changes
Pennsylvania permits legal name changes because "there is
no public interest being protected by the denial [of such a
request]" 283 and because the primary purpose of a name-change
278

In the Matter of Heilig, Sept. Term No. 38, 2003 MD LEXIS 31, 50-52 (Md.

App. Ct. Feb. 11, 2003).
279K. v. Health Division, 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ore.
1977).
280 In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832.
281 Id.
282 In the Matter of Deborah Hartin, 75 Misc. 2d 229, 232 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973);

see also Matter of Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc.2d 380, 384-385 (NY Sup.
Ct. 1966); Anonymous Petitioner v. Irving Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 378 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977).
283 In the Matter of McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. 1998).
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statute is to prevent fraud, so the purpose would
not be frustrated
284
by permitting a transsexual to change his name.
Furthermore, New Jersey permits name changes to anyone,
for any reason, so long as fraud or other improper purpose is not
perceived.285 New York also permits transsexuals to change their
name. 286

In Ohio, however, a transsexual's name change application
is rejected, especially if the Court "premises its belief that [a]
request may have been made without thorough consideration of the
consequences, as well as a finding that [an applicant] has not
undergone, 7 and has not scheduled, gender reassignment
28
surgery.
Marriage Licenses
Ohio has stated "there is no authority [ for the issuance of
a marriage license to consummate a marriage between a post288
operative male to female transsexual person and a male person."
Also, New York invalidated a marriage between a female to male
transsexual
because a marriage license required one man and
289
woman.

Spousal Support
In New Jersey, a man knowingly married a male to female
transsexual; when they divorced, the husband claimed he did not
owe his ex-wife alimony because the marriage was void. 290 The
Court found the marriage valid because the wife's sex
29 1
reassignment had been complete.

4 Id. at 403.
285 In the Matter of the Application of John William Eck, 584 A.2d 859, 860-861

(N.J. App. Ct. 1991).

286 In the Matter of Anonymous, 57 Misc.2d 813, 817 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968)
287 In the Matter of Richard Clark Mahoney, Case No. CA2000-08-168,

at 11
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2001).
288 In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio P.C. 1987).
2'9 B v. B, 78 Misc. 2d 112, 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
290 M.T. v. J.T. 355 A.2d 204, 205-208 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976).
291 Id.at 211.
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Custody
In Nevada, Mr. Daly, a natural father, had his parental
292
rights terminated after he underwent sex reassignment surgery.
Even though the standards used in this case to determine parental
fitness were overturned (best interest standard was implemented in
its place),293 there is no record indicating whether Mr. Daly has
pursued reinstatement of his rights.
In Missouri, a natural father was restricted to limited
visitation of his children while he underwent sex reassignment
surgery.294 The Court ordered counseling for the mother, father and
children before a modification in custody would occur.295 The
Court stated, "[i]n determining the best interest of the children, the
court may consider the conduct of the parents. ' 296 The Court
further stated, "[c]onsideration of [a parent's] conduct is not
limited to 7that which has in fact detrimentally affected the
29
children."
Tort Claims
The Littleton case was previously addressed when the
Court's summary of law was discussed. For the sake of clarity, it
will be highlighted briefly once again. This case involved a male to
female transsexual who married a man; her husband then died as a
result of medical malpractice. 298 When Littleton attempted to sue
the doctor, the Court found the marriage to be invalid because she
was still male under Texas law, and thus lacked standing to file
suit.299 The Court further stated an original birth certificate is "an
official document," and any alteration on it is simply ministerial
3
when there are no fact-finding or public policy considerations. 00
292 Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Nev. 1986).
293

294
295

In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126, 132 (Nev. 2000)
J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).

Id. at 773.

Id. at 775 (citing In re Marriage of Campbell, 868 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Mo.
A p.S.D. 1993).
296

29

298
299

Id.
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224-226 (Tex. 4th Dist. 1999).
Id. at 231.

300id.
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Probate
The Gardinercase was also mentioned by the Court, thus,
summarized previously. However, it merits further discussion in
order to emphasize the current legal status of transsexuals in
America. Kansas found the marriage between a male to female
transsexual void because the legislature's silence on
transsexualism could only be interpreted to exclude them from
marriage. 30 1 The Supreme Court went on to say "[t]he words 'sex,'
'male,' and 'female,' in everyday understanding do not encompass
transsexuals." 30 2 By concluding that Kansas' marriage statute did
not allow recognition of a reassigned sex, the marriage was void,
and a right to inheritance from that marriage was found to lack
legal standing.30 3
Governmental Agency
The Social Security Administration permits records to be
altered if there is clinical or medical evidence showing the sex
change surgery has been completed. 3°
Prisons
The federal prison system houses pre-operative
transsexuals with inmates according to their birth gender. Once the
inmate is post-operative, then he/she is housed with inmates of the
newly acquired gender. 305 This seems to suggest that federal
prisons accept the assigned gender as the inmates "legal" gender.
However, this suggestion should not lead to a conclusion that the
federal prison system is giving "legal recognition" to the
transsexual's new sex. In fact, this choice to place transsexuals
In the Matter of the Estate of Marshall Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan.
2002).
301

302

Id.

303

Id. at 137 (affirming lower court's summary judgment in favor of Gardiner's

son).

304 In the Matter of Heilig, Sept. Term No. 38, 2003 MD LEXIS 31, 50 (Feb. 11,

2003 Md. Ct. App.)(citing, SSA Program Operations Manual System RM
00203.210 (Changing Numident Date), § C at 4).
305 Heilig, supra note 303 at 51(citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 ( th
7
Cir. 1993).
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with inmates of the new sex may be for nothing more than safety
reasons.
Summary
It may by useful to summarize what types of cases are most
likely to consider transsexuals as members of their new assigned
sex. Name changes seem to be the area most likely to allow a
transsexual to modify his or her identity; Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and New York permit name changes; Ohio, however, does not.
Permitting name changes may not be indicative of any real
legal change. In fact, to change one's name from a male to a
female name does very little to change the person's true identity.
Some names, such as "Casey," "Pat," or "Sam" have historically
been interchanged between men and women, and do not classify
one's sex.
Proceedings that carry a legal consequence are more
reluctant to permit transsexuals to be identified as their new sex.
For example, legal documents such as birth certificates have yet to
accept a transsexual's new sex; Ohio, Oregon, and New York have
explicitly rejected such claims, while Maryland, on the other hand,
has adopted a statute permitting transsexuals to alter their birth
certificates upon sex reassignment.
One important matter merits reiteration, in 1987 and again
as recently as 2001, Ohio ruled that it will not allow a transsexual a
name change. 30 6 As previously stated, this seems to contradict
Michael's testimony. He told the Court that Ohio changed his birth
certificate in 1999, but had misplaced it.30 7 This inconsistency
between standing law in Ohio and Michael's testimony could have
been resolved with menial research. Yet, without further inquiry,
the Court relied on Michael's testimony, and in turn, concluded
that even under a traditionalist view Michael is male because his

306

See In the Matter of Richard Clark Mahoney, Case No. CA2000-08-168, at

11 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2001); In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513
N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio P.C. 1987).
307 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6k" Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archiveltrials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
762.
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new birth certificate
indicates he is male, so the marriage is valid
30 8
under Florida law.
Another legal document that is not likely to be altered is a
marriage license; Ohio and New York have both rejected such
claims. Yet, New Jersey has awarded spousal support to a wife that
was born a man, but underwent sex reassignment; thus, implying
the validity of a marriage license should a transsexual seek to
apply for one.
Furthermore, in a probate proceeding, the marriage
between a transsexual wife and her husband was void, thus,
nullifying her claim to the estate. Likewise, in a wrongful death
claim, a transsexual wife was unable to sue her husband's doctor
because she lacked standing as a legally recognizable wife.
It seems clear that Courts are more inclined to permit a
transsexual to adopt his/her new sex so long as such recognition
does not have a legal effect. The more legal impact a requested
change may result in, the less likely Courts have been to grant
them. Petitions for name changes may be commonly permitted, but
the legal consequence of such a change is menial. When the legal
consequences of marriage, are at stake (like probate and tort
issues), courts have been reluctant to permit sexual identity
changes. This pattern is important; it signifies the current status of
transsexual recognition in the United States. The Court's failure to
consider this status further illustrates the legal instability of its
reasoning. It further seems that Michael's marriage, except in New
Jersey, would not have been considered valid anywhere else in the
country.
The custody cases previously cited demonstrate reluctance
by the courts to grant primary residency to a transsexual parent,
even when a natural parent was involved. While no two custody
cases are exact, it is important to note the country's position on
transsexual parenting. The Court should have reviewed these cases
in the opinion, especially when considering the best interest of
Mathew and Irina. The fact that such decisions are merely
persuasive in Florida, and not binding, cannot be argued; due to the

308

id.
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lack of transsexual cases in the world, the entire opinion had to
rely on persuasive authority for guidance.
Even though these custody cases illuminate some of the
shortcomings of the Kantaras opinion, it is crucial to note one
important distinction; the cases cited involved a natural parent who
underwent sex reassignment after the children were born. Even
though Michael adopted Mathew, the adoption was only
considered valid because Michael presented himself as a man; if
Michael's sex would not be acknowledged as male, but as a female
dating Linda (another woman), then Mathew's adoption would
violate Florida's anti-gay adoption statute, and therefore, be void.
Based on the preceding sections, it may be clear that the
Court's opinion failed to adequately determine the validity of the
marriage itself under both Florida law, and from other
jurisdictions. Likewise, if Michael's marriage to Linda was void
under Florida's prohibition of same-sex marriages, then Michael's
adoption of Mathew should have been void under Florida's antigay adoption statute. Therefore, the following section outlines
Florida's position on gay adoption.
WOULD MATHEW'S ADOPTION BE LEGAL IN FLORIDA?

Florida has stated that, "[n]o person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual. 3 °9 In Seebol
v. Farie, a gay man with impeccable credentials was denied an
31
opportunity to adopt solely premised on his sexual orientation. 0
The 16th Judicial Circuit for Monroe County found Florida's ban
on homosexual adoptions unconstitutional; this decision was never
appealed.3 1'
Shortly thereafter, Cox v. HRS attempted to duplicate the
Seebol decision, and the Second District of Florida Circuit also

31 FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (West 1997).
310

Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16' h Cir. Ct. 1991).

311

Id.
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However, on appeal, the
found the statute unconstitutional.
Florida Supreme Court found the statute was constitutional.313
The most recent case contesting the constitutionality of
Florida's prohibition of gay adoptions was Lofton v. Kearney,
proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, Key West Division. Lofton sued Florida's Department of
Children and Families for an Equal Protection violation. 314 The
District Court granted defendant's summary judgment because the
right to adopt was not a fundamental right protected by the Equal
Protection Clause. 315 The Court also refused to apply a strict
scrutiny analysis of Florida's gay adoption statute because
homosexuals were not a suspect class.316 Finally, Florida's goal of
placing children with married, couples was found to serve a
legitimate governmental interest. 3 17

The Florida Supreme Court has ruled the anti-gay adoption
statute as constitutional. Given this conclusion, it is clear that
Florida's position is to permit only heterosexuals the right to adopt.
Michael himself may not be gay, instead he is a transsexual; 3 18 this
distinction, however, may be irrelevant for mainstream society.
Transsexualism may not be at the forefront of public concern or
legislation because it is not unmistakably obvious to most of
society. If an individual appears to be like the rest of society, then
chances are they will most likely blend in. Hence, they will remain
free from oppressive legislation.
Homosexuals, on the other hand, are visibly uncommon
from mainstream society. If two men hold hands in public,
attention is drawn to them, social panic in suburban America gives
way, and legislation erupts to keep them isolated. A female to male
312

Cox v. Health & Rehabilitative Services of Florida, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220

(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1993).
313 Cox v. Health & Rehabilitative Services of Florida, 656 So.2d 902, 903
(Fla.
1995).
314
Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
315 Id. at 1381-1385.
3 16
3 17

id.
1d.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.conarchive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
796.
318
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transsexual may appear to be male. When this transsexual holds
the hand of a very feminine woman, society is not alarmed because
they look just like everyone else. Hence, legislation is not needed
to impede their rights.
Simply because society may prefer a transsexual (who
appears to be engaged in a heterosexual relationship) over a
homosexual (who clearly appears to be at odds with society) does
not indicate a legislative intent to permit transsexual adoption.
When a statute is ambiguous, as stated by the Court, the court must
look to the intent of the legislature. 319 Here, the Florida Legislature
has made it explicitly clear; their intent is to place children with
married couples. 32 Yet, this clear legislative mandate was
"innocuous" to the Court when he found Michael's marriage to
Linda valid and the subsequent adoption of Mathew valid.321
How COULD MICHAEL BE IRINA'S FATHER?

By invalidating the marriage, Michael could not have been
Irina's legal father at the time of her birth. Further, he has not yet
legally adopted her.322 The Court did not elaborate on Irna's legal
relationship to Michael, other than to say Michael was the father
because the marriage to Linda was valid, so his name was legally
as Linda's husband. Hence,
placed on Irina's birth certificate
323
Irina's legal father by marriage.
Florida law is clear that a child conceived during the
marriage but bom after its dissolution is legitimate. 324 Indeed, the
presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest rebuttable
presumptions known to the law. 325 While this presumption may be
319

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
726.
320 FLA. STAT.

ch. 63.042(3) (1997).

Supra note 318, at 717.
322 Id. at 807.
321

323

Id. at 807.

324 Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Privette, 617
So. 2d 305,

307-308 (Fla. 1993).
t
325 Casbar v. DiCanio, 666 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 4 h D.C.A. 1996); Dennis v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 566 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 5th
D.C.A. 1990).
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strong, it should not withstand if Michael cannot possibly be the
father. For clearly obvious medical reasons, Michael, who was
born a female, cannot be the biological father of Irina.326 Even if
the marriage between Michael and Linda were valid, the
legitimacy presumption has traditionally existed to legitimize a
child conceived in a marriage between one man and one woman.
Assuming that Florida did allow homosexual marriages,
and a gay couple conceived a child through artificial insemination,
would the courts consider the child to be the legitimate child of the
non-biological parent? Clearly they would not consider the child to
be legitimate under the current legitimacy presumption. The nonbiological parent would probably be required to legally adopt the
child. As previously discussed, homosexual couples living in
Florida are prevented from adopting children, so this option of
legitimizing a child would be unavailable to a gay couple.
Yet, the Court stated its concern over protecting the
legitimacy of Irina; is the legitimacy of all children not of equal
value? 327 Unfortunately, Florida law explicitly prohibits gay
couples from adopting a child conceived through artificial
insemination; those children are not considered legitimate, and the
Court failed to accurately follow this reasoning in its analysis.
The proceeding sections will appraise the Court's decision
to award primary residency to Michael. The remainder of this
paper now assumes the marriage between Linda and Michael is
invalid under Florida law. Therefore, Michael's custody claim can
only be considered as a third-party, i.e. a non-parent, loco parentis,
psychological parent, or de facto parent.
SHOULD MICHAEL HAVE BEEN AWARDED CUSTODY UNDER
FLORIDA LAW AS A THIRD PARTY?

In Florida, preserving the traditional family unit is highly
regarded. Unless a parent abandons a child, is unfit or is disabled
326 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6 th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
807 (reiterating the fact that Irina was conceived through artificial
insemination).
327 See generally Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986); Pickett v. Brown, 462
U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
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from exercising custody, third parties, even grandparents, will not
gain custody. 328 However, a stepparent, like a psychological
parent, may be awarded custody if it is the child's best interest, and
if the child's welfare is at stake. 329 Yet, the Second District of
Florida has recently stated third party awards are unusual and
330
drastic, thus, requiring evidence to support such extreme action.
A natural parent's right "to enjoy the custody, fellowship
and companionship of his offspring .... This is a rule older than
the common law itself., 33 1 Florida will not recognize the bond
between a child and a third party over the rights of a traditional
family unit, unless the child's welfare is in jeopardy. 332 For
example, if a parent abandons a child, is unfit or is disabled from
exercising custody. 333 However, a stepparent who becomes a
psychological parent may be awarded custody if it is in the child's
best interest. 334 This is, nevertheless, limited to very unusual and
drastic circumstances,335and they require strong evidence to support
such extreme action.
An example of when Florida may award custody to a third
336
a natural parent can be found in Gorman v. Gorman.
over
party
In this case, the child's natural father married shortly after the
natural mother died; she died as the result of complications from
the birth of the child in the dispute.337 The stepmother, standing in
loco parentis, cared for this child's every need, and did so in such
a manner, that the child never knew she was not his natural mother
until he was 10 years of age. 331 The child "felt like he never had a
father because his father was often away from home, was
frequently intoxicated, physically abused and blamed the child for
the death of his natural mother, telling the child on one occasion
Alderman v. Alderman, 484 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986).
Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So.2d 75, 77-78 (Fla 5th D.C.A. 1981).
Plantilla v. Plantilla, 777 So.2d 978, 980 (Fla. 2nd Dist. 2000).
331 Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Fla. 2000).
332 Alderman, 484 So.2d at, 1387.
328

329
330

333

id.

Gorman, 400 So.2d at, 77-78.
Plantilla,777 So.2d at, 980.
336 Gorman, 400 So.2d at 78.
334
331

337 Id.
338

Id..
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'your mother died 13 years ago because of you and don't you ever
339
Consequently, the Fifth District Court of Appeals
awarded custody of this child to his stepmother. 34
When someone stands in loco parentis to a child he/she has
an obligation to support and care for that child. 34 1 However, should
that marriage end in dissolution, any relationship in loco parentis
between the non-parent and the child accordingly terminates the
obligation of support. 342 Likewise, any right to care for the child
creating in the natural parent
upon that dissolution is also severed,
343
privacy.
to
right
a constitutional
Even though Florida courts have recognized the concept of
a psychological parent (i.e. loco parentis), they have not construed
those cases as holding a psychological parent equivalent to a
biological parent.344 As previously stated, the child's welfare must
be in jeopardy before a non-parent will be considered as a primary
care giver. 34 Further, since "the concept of loco parentis has
appeared only in the context of a marital relationship," it is
inapplicable to cases involving unmarried couples.14 Without
achieving a status equivalent to the biological parent, a third party
custody or visitation of a child against a
lacks standing to seek 347
wishes.
parent's
natural
Gorman serves as an ideal example illustrating the
circumstances under which a child should be removed from his/her
natural parent(s). A parent that is intoxicated, and completely
uninvolved in the care and rearing of his/her child, can be deemed
unfit. The influence of such a parent on a child can be construed as
detrimental. There is nothing in the Kantaras record demonstrating
forget it.' '

339
340

id..
Id. at 79.

Taylor v. Taylor, 279 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4"' D.C.A. 1973).
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4"h D.C.A. 1999).
Taylor, 279 So. 2d at 364.
Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 110.
Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So.2d at 77-78.
346
Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 111.
347 id.
341

342
343
344
345
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Linda to be unfit. In fact, the Court rated both34parents
equally
8
loving and affectionate towards Mathew and Irina.
In Music v. Rachford, a lesbian couple decided .to have a
child via artificial insemination. Once the relationship terminated,
the non-parent, claiming to be a "de-facto" parent, ,sought
visitation and shared parental responsibility. 349 The First District
Court of Appeals rejected the claim because Florida's. Supreme
Court has found that interference in a natural family unit violates
Florida's constitutional right to parental privacy."' Only a
showing of 35
demonstrable
harm to the child would justify state
1
intervention.
The Music holding demonstrates Florida's reluctance to
recognize any rights a psychological parent may have. Despite the
Court's desire to provide financial stability for Irina and Michael,
the truth is, Florida does not promote such an interest. The Music
case involved two consenting adults, just like Michael and Linda,
who agreed to have one parent artificially inseminated, as Linda
and Michael did. Yet, unlike the Court's decision, the First District
Court of Appeals denied the non-biological parent any rights to
visitation, much less custody.
The First District, though not explicit in the Music opinion,
may have been reluctant to grant the non-biological parent any
rights because two women were involved in the custody dispute,
because they did not possess a statutory right to marriage. Since
the Court, however, found Michael Kantaras to be male, thus
validating the marriage, Irina was legally Michael's daughter, as
stated on her birth certificate.
Lesbian and gay couples, on the other hand, are not
afforded the luxury of appearing as a heterosexual couple to the
unsuspecting public. Homosexuals present themselves to the public
as members of their birth sex. And now, it seems that a gay couple
wishing to have parental rights legally recognized must undergo
Kantaras v. Kantaras , No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6 th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
785.
349 Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. s t D.C.A. 1995),
350
See Von Eiff v. Aziciri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514-15 (Fla. 1998).
348

351

Id.
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the cumbersome, brutal, and expensive ordeal of changing their
sex in order to benefit from parenthood. A careful reading of the
Court's .opinion encourages such extreme behavior.
Recognition of Michael's role as a father may have a
backlash on gay families attempting to have their parental rights
legally recognized. Florida law, as stated, has religiously blocked
homosexuals from obtaining equal rights to adoption and marriage.
Children living in a household with two same-sex parents will lose
the love and financial support of the non-biological parent. Yet, the
Court emphasized the important role Michael played in the lives of
the children he raised from birth, and emphatically commented on
the loss of financial stability if Michael was removed from their
lives. Unfortunately, children raised by homosexual couples in
Florida have yet to be considered worthy of such protection from
their legal system.
In the Kantaras case, it is undisputable that Irna and
Mathew have only known Michael to be their father. However
significant that bond may be, it is insufficient to remove the
children from Linda. Linda is the natural mother of both Mathew
and Irina; Michael adopted Mathew against Florida's legislative
intent to place children in traditional families, and Irina was born
to a marriage in violation of Florida's anti-gay statute. These
limitations on Michael's legal status as a natural parent require
Linda to be unfit before Michael can even be considered as a
viable parent.
The opinion drafted by the Court failed to demonstrate
Linda's unfitness. In fact, both Linda and Michael were rated
equally in the love and affection criterion. 35 2 The only areas in
which Linda lost to Michael were in her financial stability, moral
character, and willingness to allow the children to visit Michael.353
Each of these three categories will be addressed below in order to
determine the extent of Linda's unfitness, if any even exists.

352

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla.

6 th

Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),

available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
785.
151 Id. at 786-789.
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DID THE COURT CONSIDER?
Financial Stability
The primary focus of the Court was Michael's ability to
provide for the financial security of the children. 354 In deter'nining
custody, however, a court cannot rely on one parent's material or
economic benefit over the emotional and social welfare, and
personal stability of the child.355 One parent's ability,to earn a
substantially greater income is not a dominant factor in custody
determinations. 356 When one parent is earning more, a court does
not place the child with that parent; instead, the court must seek to
eliminate that imbalance so the child can remain with the more
WHAT INTERESTS

suitable parent.

5

The economic potential of one parent "does not control or
dominate the upbringing of our children." 358 Instead, it is the moral
influence possessed by the parents that should be the primary
concern for a Court ordained with the responsibility of determining
custody. 359 In the end, it is the welfare of the child as a whole that
must be preserved.360
This principle is recognized in many states. In Oregon, for
example, a stay-at-home mother is not denied primary residency of
her natural children simply because she did not work.36 ' In such a
situation, the court awards the mother alimony and allows her to
reside at2 the marital home with the children, as their primary care
36
giver.
In Tennessee a stay-at-home mother is likewise allotted
spousal support and primary residency of the children if she is a fit
354

Id. at 158.

355 Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1975); (See generally Layeni v.

Layeni, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 2421 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2003) (allowing a mother
primary residency of her children even though she was a full-time, stay-at-home

mom).
356

id. at 9.

357

id.
Id. at 10

35 8

359 Id.

360 id.

361
362

In re Marriage of Arand & Arand, 49 P.3d 799, 800-801 (Ore. 2002)
Id. at 801-802.
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and able parent. 363 The fitness of a parent is not weighed against
the standard of perfection. Courts "understand that perfection in
marriage and parenting is as evanescent as it is in life's other
pursuits." 364 Instead the court attempts to determine which parent,
in light of their present circumstances, is better fit to assume and
discharge'the responsibilities of being a custodial parent. 365
Furthermore, in Wisconsin the stay-at-home status of a
parent is not considered in determining custody. 366 Even though a
court may be suspicious of an ex-spouse who stays at home and
attempts to have an increase in child support payments, they367will
not determine the primary residency of the child on that basis.
These cases illustrate that courts are reluctant to penalize
stay-at-home mothers for their efforts to care for their children.
Linda stayed at home, but she contributed to the caring of her
children by working at their school, and joining the PTA.3 6 8 Yet,
the Court considered Michael to possess "a more positive interest
in advancing the children academically"
because he has
36 9
education.
their
of
costs
underwritten the
In fact, the opinion goes on to belittle Linda by
emphasizing that she "has no formal education, [and that she
stopped] at the high school level. 37 ° Michael, on the other hand,
does not possess any "college level education either, but he
actively pursues school activities with the children." 371 In
summary, neither parent went to college, both are actively
involved in the children's schooling, but Michael pays for the costs
of school supplies (both children attend public schools, so there are
363

Tannette v. Rice, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 509, 8 (Ten. 2001)

364 Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680, 682-83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Gaskill v.

Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
365 Tannette, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 509 at 6-7.
366 In re the Marriage of: Paul Nelson, v. Susan Nelson Candee, 556 N.W.2d
784,
367 785-786 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
Id.at 788.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6"h Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
788.
368

369

Id.

370

Id.

371Id..

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XII

no tuition expenses), so the Court rewards Michael as the parent
more likely to contribute academically.
Linda's Mental Health and Moral Character
In West Virginia, custody determinations are made
according to the primary caretaker principle. 372 Namely, the parent
that provides the most care for the child will be awarded residential
custody. 373 If both parents provide equal care, then the court is left
with the burden of determining which parent will meet the best
interests of the child.374 This determination is375
made with the help
of testimony from mental health professionals.
However, a court's reliance on the information provided by
these counselors should be accepted with caution. 76Especially
when one parent may not have the "means to retain their own
experts or if publicly compensated experts or experts compensated
by only one side have uncurbed leave to express opinions which
may be subjective
or are not narrowly controlled by the underlying
377
facts."
Michael presented all of the medical opinion offered in the
Kantaras trial. Linda, on the other hand, was portrayed as an
immorally corrupt and mentally unstable parent. Yet, most of
society would probably consider a husband who encourages his
wife to enter into a three-way marriage with another woman as
extremely immoral.378 Not once did the Court address Michael's
desire to remain married to Linda, as well as Sherry.
Further, given Florida's reluctance to accept gay adoptions
or same-sex marriages, it can be presumed that "morality" consists
of one traditionalman and one traditionalwoman. In addition, the
Court saw Linda's reliance on her newfound passion for religion as
Ann v. Daniel, 435 S.E.2d 6, 9 (W. Va. 1993)
id.
374 Id. at 10.
375 Id.
376 Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).
372
373

377

id.

Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, at
155.
378
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a flaw, instead of an asset. Most of society would likely relate
the Court considered Michael to be
religion with morality; yet
379
morally superior to Linda.
Social Stigma of the Children
Another factor to consider is Linda's concern over the
social stigma her children may face as a result of Michael's
transsexualism. The Court did not praise Linda for attempting to
protect Mathew and Irna from the brutality of an unsympathetic
society. In fact, the child's "best interest" is not determined by who
would make a better parent, or by who would afford the child a
better background or superior comforts, it is not even determined
by the amount of love shared between the child and the parent
seeking custody. 380 Instead, the Court must be "guided by
principles which reflect a considered social judgment in this
society respecting the family and parenthood. 381
As previously discussed, both Nevada and Missouri have
considered it to be detrimental to a child's welfare to remain in the
custody of a transsexual parent. 382 In both of those cases there was
not even the issue of a third custody dispute; both parents were
natural, and neither was considered to be a fit parent. However,
neither one of these instances were mentioned in the Kantaras
opinion.
Linda's Willingness to Encourage Visitation
The only criterion supported by the weight of the evidence
was Linda's unwillingness to encourage visitation; therefore, the
Court's decision to award Michael with credit for this category was
correct. It only stands correct, however, under the assumption that
the marriage was valid, and that Michael stood as a natural parent,
in equal footing to Linda. As a third party, however, Linda would
have absolutely no duty to even allow minimal visitation. In fact,
natural parents are not even required to provide grandparents with
...
380 Id. at 786.
381

Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 549.
Id.

382

Supra notes 300, 302.

383

Id.
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visitation of their grandchildren. 384 Therefore, the only custody
factor accurately made by the Court according to the weight of the
evidence, fails under a third party standard of review.
Summary
After reviewing the custody factors cited by the Court, it is
clear that Linda was not an unfit parent. In fact, both Linda and
Michael scored favorably on most categories. The biggest obstacle
for Linda was her lack of financial resources. A parent's mediocre
income is insufficient to conclude that he or she is unfit. The
Court's reliance on Linda's monetary status and moral instability
laid the foundation of its custody determination. As noted,
however, this criterion alone is not enough to find Linda to be an
unfit parent. Therefore, under Florida law, Michael lacks standing
to even claim custody as a third party.
WOULD MICHAEL BE AWARDED CUSTODY AS A

THIRD PARTY

OUTSIDE OF FLORIDA?

Third party custody dispute standards vary between states;
however, it appears that most standards can be categorized as
falling into one of two distinguishable groups. The first group of
states has an extremely strong parental preference, which is
difficult to rebut. 385 In some instances, a state statute may contain a
list of "factors" that, if present, will allow custody to a third party.
However, the non-parent must rebut these factors with clear and
convincing evidence of the natural parent's unfitness.
Some states require certain "factors" to be present before
custody will be awarded to a non-parent; these states are also more
likely to consider the bond between a child and a psychological
parent as equivalent to a natural parent's status. These states have a
much stronger endorsement of the best interest of the child
standard, and only minimal parental preference is accorded. The
distinctions between states will be explained.
384Alderman v. Alderman, 484 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986).
385 See generally Marshall v. Superior Court of Arizona, 701 P.2d 567, 569
(Ariz. 1985); Botnen v. Lukens, 587 N.W.2d 141, 144 (ND 1998); In the Matter
of the Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Minn. 2002).
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In Nebraska, "[a] court may not properly deprive a parent
of the custody of a minor child unless it is affirmatively shown that
such parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the
relationship, or has forfeited that right. 3 86 A natural parent's right
to the custody of his/her child will not be set aside in favor of a
third party; a court may only deprive a parent of his or her children
when that parent is unfit or has forfeited his or her parental
rights.387
In Arizona, non-parents cannot seek custody of a child that
is in the physical custody of a natural parent. 388 The only way a
third party may seek custody of a child that is in a natural parent's
custody is by following the guidelines set forth in the juvenile
code.389 Namely, a juvenile court must first find abuse or neglect
before. a third party will be considered for custody.3 90 Such
restrictions reveal the State's desire to maintain parental
preference.
In North Dakota for example, a court will not award
custody to a grandparent, much less an unrelated third party, unless
exceptional circumstances exist.391 Exceptional circumstances have
included any serious threat of harm or detriment to the child.392 A
reviewing court will also consider the best interest of the child
once a showing of detriment is found to exist; the courts may
require the presence
of a psychological bond between the child and
393
party.
third
the
In Minnesota the presumption that parents are fit can be
rebutted by a third party who proves neglect, abandonment,
incapacity, moral delinquency, instability of character, or inability

Uhing v. Uhing, 488 N.W.2d 366, 374-375 (Neb. 1992).
id.
388 Marshall v. Superior Court of Arizona, 701 P.2d 567, 569 (Ariz. 1985).
319 Id. at 570.
390 id.
391 Botnen v. Lukens, 587 N.W.2d 141, 144 (ND 1998).
392 Id.
393 Id.
386
387
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to furnish the child with needed care. 394
The reasons presented to
395
weighty".
and
"grave
be
the court must
In the Kantaras case, there was never a determination of
Linda's unfitness. Similar to the standard used in Florida, the
Group I states require a high standard of unfitness before a parent's
constitutional right to care for his/her children is denied. Linda did
not abandon her children, nor was she was ever found to be
morally delinquent. In fact, Michael would probably be considered
to be "morally delinquent" by mainstream society; middle-class
America is not likely to accept transsexualism as "moral".
Furthermore, Linda has not abused the children, or placed
them in harm's way. She attends PTA meetings, and has worked at
their school; these are not signs of neglect and abuse, but of love
and concern. Therefore, Michael would be unable to claim custody
of Mathew and Irina in jurisdictions with a strong parental
preference.
In Arkansas, natural parents are preferred, but a stepparent
may be awarded custody if the natural parent is "unfit because of
his or her poverty, [or unable] to provide 396
the moral training
child.
the
of
being
well
and
essential to the life
In California, third parties will be awarded custody if there
is an "express finding that parental custody would be detrimental
to the child and that finding must be supported by evidence
showing that parental custody would actually harm the child., 397 If
removing a child from a non-parent may be detrimental to the
child's well being, then such detriment will be balanced against the
State's parental preference. 398 Sufficient detriment may be found
to
399
exist if a child will suffer when separated from the non-parent.
Georgia actually considers adoptive parents to be third
parties, thus, stripping them of the parental presumption. 400 Natural
394

In the Matter of the Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Minn. 2002).

395 i

.

Golden v. Golden, 942 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).
Adoption of Danielle G. v. Jaime T., 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 341, 346 (Cal 4th
D.C.A.
1974).
398
Id. at 348.
396
397

399 id.

4(0 Clarke v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Ga. 2001).
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parents however, have a "rebuttable presumption that parental
custody is always in the child's best interest." 40 1 If a third party
shows,',by clear and convincing evidence, that such an award
would be harmful to the child, then the presumption is
overcome. 40 2 The interested third party is then required to prove
that awarding him or her custody will be in the child's best
interest.40-3

In Alaska, similar to those states listed under Group I, a
third party will gain custody only if "it clearly would be
detrimental" for a child to remain with a natural parent. 40 4 A
stepparent, however, may be awarded custody even if the natural
parent has done nothing more than attempt to damage the child's
relationship with the stepparent. 40 5 Additionally, if removing a
child from a psychological parent would cause psychological
harm
40 6
custody.
denied
be
will
parent
natural
a
to a child, then
In Connecticut there is a parental preference that can 40be7
overcome by substantial evidence proving the parent is unfit.
For example, a parent having poor judgment, overreacting to a
misbehaving child and deficient in parenting skills may be deemed
unfit.40 8 Additionally, a stepparent may overcome the parental
presumption if the natural parent places his or her needs before the
child' s.409
In Colorado third parties may be awarded custody even if
the natural parent is not found to be unfit. 410 Even though parents
may benefit from a presumption of fitness, the courts will award

Id.
Id. at 108.
"3 Id. at 107.
4 Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 154 (Alaska 2002).
405 Id at 152.
401

42
1

4061Id.
407

Foster v. Devino, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1161, 10-11 (Conn. App. Ct.

1994).
o8 Id. at 10-13.
409 In re Curt R., Jr., 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2988, 3-7 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1994).
410 In the Matter of the Custody of C.C.R.S. v T.A.M. and M.A.M., 892 P.2d
246, 256-257 (Colo. 1995).
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custody according to the child's best interest.411 Courts however,
seem to require a psychological attachment between the interested
third party and the child.412
In Idaho, even though there is a parental preference, if a
"child has been in the custody of a third party for an appreciable
time, and thereby developed a bond with that person, the custody
of the child will be awarded to that party if the best interests of the
child so dictate. 4 1 3 Custody can also be awarded to a third party if
the parent is deemed unfit or has abandoned the child. 4
At first glance, it may appear that Michael would gain
custody within Group II states. However, when the best interests of
the children are considered, the Court's analysis serves as a
roadmap. Recall, the Court did not determine custody under a third
party standard; he evaluated Michael and Linda as natural parents,
hence, the best interest of the child standard.
Under the more liberal "best interest" standard, both
parents are considered "equal," and the children are placed with
the parent that can provide them with the best care. First,
considering Michael: he is a transsexual, unable to accept the fact
that he does not have a penis, he has emotional problems because
he cannot do all of the things that "men" can do, he did not receive
education past high school, he was unfaithful to his wife, he
encouraged Linda to engage in polygamous marriage with Sherry,
he encourages visitation between Linda and the children, and he
stocked his pants with socks in front of Mathew in order to create
the illusion of a penis. Nevertheless, he has always provided
financial support and has allowed Linda visitation.
Now Linda: she is extremely angry that Michael cheated,
she is highly disappointed and angry with Sherry (her former best
friend) for having an affair with Michael behind her back, she was
not substantially employed, she did not study past high school, she
attends a church that tells her homosexuality is a sin (as do most
churches, and as most religious Americans believe), she is afraid
411

Id.

4 12

id.

In re the Guardianship of Kristopher Copenhaver, 865 P.2d 979, 983 (Idaho
1993).
414
413

id.

2004

KANTARAS V. KANTARAS...

that her children will suffer psychological and emotional problems
as a result of Michael's gender identity disorder, she wants to
ensure her children are not scarred by the social stigma of having a
transsexual parent, and she restricts Michael's visitation.
Comparing the qualities most discussed by the Court, it is
difficult to understand how Michael can serve the best interests of
Mathew and Irina. The only criteria more favorable for Michael
are his willingness to encourage visitation and his financial
stability. As previously noted, however, natural parents are not
held accountable for prohibiting visitation between their children
and a non-parent, so this category is moot.
Regarding Michael and Linda's financial stability, it would
be an affront to public policy if custody determinations were based
solely on a parent's financial resources. If this were to become the
standard by which our children are placed, we would return to a
system of patriarchy where women, who still earn substantially
less than their male counterparts, would rarely win custody of their
children. Therefore, Michael's superior financial security is not a
proper measurement for determining the children's best interests.
Other factors, though, seem to favor Linda. She was
faithful, is religious (which in the eyes of the judiciary and
mainstream America is almost always a plus), stayed at home to
care for her children, and refused to engage in a polygamous
relationship with Michael and Sherry. These are characteristics that
may be considered to be admirable. Yet, the Court overlooked all
of these factors. In summary, it seems that even in the more
progressive liberal states Linda would still be awarded primary
custody.
Conclusion
The issue of transsexualism has gained much notoriety in
recent years. The social trend seems to be one of eventual
acceptance and political correctness towards issues of sexual
identity and orientation. Unmistakably, society seems to be
attempting to repair its shameful history of intolerable homophobic
discrimination. However, the law and current legal standards
cannot be overlooked for the sake of appearing socially just.
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The Court may have been attempting to protect Michael's
interests in this case because of the barriers society has placed
upon him as a transsexual. Those who followed this dispute from
its inception felt as though Michael would be unable to receive fair
and equitable treatment. Yet, as noted by Judge,: O'Brien's
condescending tones during the proceeding, it was Linda who
faced the obstacles.
The irony of this case is that most civil rights and gay
activists consider this decision to be a landmark victory for sexual
minorities. 415 Activists may believe that Michael's victory, despite
the Court's unsound reasoning, displays a progressive judicial
trend. In reality, the gay and transgendered movement has been
thwarted.
The reasoning set forth in the Kantaras decision fails to
create the foundation needed to establish equality for sexual
minorities. First, the Court should have displayed impartiality
toward Linda. By failing to do so, its decision to award custody to
Michael appears to be based on bias against Linda, instead of
Michael's true merits. Subsequently, Michael does not seem to win
custody because he is the better parent, he is awarded custody
because the judge apparently disliked Linda as a person. These
personal biases are the same negative influences that may decide
cases involving sexual minorities in the future. Decisions premised
on sound legal reasoning, instead of personal biases, is the only
true line of attack against discriminatory treatment. Therefore, the
Kantaras decision, despite popular belief, did not advance the
rights of sexual minorities.
A second reason why the Court's decision thwarts the
sexual minority movement can be attributed to the tedious,
exploitive, and financially draining inquiry that may be expected in
future cases involving transsexuals. Michael was fortunate to have
his legal services provided to him pro bono. Not all transsexuals,
however, will be financially able to pay typical attorney fees,
especially fees associated with trial work. The Kantaras decision
may require transsexuals in future cases to undergo similarly
Sexual minorities will be used as a general term to include: homosexuals,
transsexuals, transgenders, and bisexuals.
415
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probative questioning. These types of inquiries may require
individuals to expose embarrassing details, and may actually
jeopardize their personal relationships, their careers, their right to
privacy, and even their safety.
While the Court may have felt compelled to determine
Michael's sex by way of medical testimony, in reality, a more
progressive and much simpler method would have been as
effective and less intrusive. In the United Kingdom, Parliament is
considering the passage of the Gender Recognition Bill. (cite
here?)If passed, the Bill would allow transsexuals to receive full
recognition of their newly acquired sex. The process would require
transsexuals to apply to a panel (consisting of legal and medical
professionals). The applicant would only need to meet a threeprong test: 1) be diagnosed with gender dysphoria, 2) have lived as
a member of the new sex for two prior years, and 3) intend to live
in the acquired sex until death. Similarly, the KantarasCourt could
have concluded that Michael was legally male after conducting a
brief inquiry into his medical and psychological history.
A third reason why the Kantaras decision fails to advance
the rights of sexual minorities is the disparate judicial treatment
between homosexuals and transsexuals. When (and if) the
Kantaras decision is accepted as precedent transsexuals will
receive better treatment than homosexuals. In Florida, for example,
homosexuals are not permitted to adopt. Prior to the Kantaras
decision transsexuals would have been grouped into the statutory
ban prohibiting gay adoptions and would likely have been
prohibited from adopting. Courts may now begin to extend
adoption and marriage rights to individuals reassigning their sex,
but will continue to deny similar rights to homosexuals.
Such discrepancies in the law are inherently unjust and
perpetuate the moral standards of society. In substance, society
may be willing to accept a union between two individuals,
regardless of their natural sex, if they appear normal to mainstream
America. Same sex couples wishing to remain as members of their
birth sex will now be subjected to further disparate treatment by
Florida courts. Homosexuals in Florida, or internationally for that
matter, do not receive the same rights as heterosexuals. As a result
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of the Kantaras decision, homosexuals may have been demoted
within the social ranks of sexual minorities.
The Court should have opted to dispute the constitutionality
of Florida's ban against homosexual adoptions. By doing,.so, the
Court could have avoided the extensive inquiry into Michael's
personal history. Furthermore, refuting the constitutionality of
Florida's ban would have been a truly progressive step for all
sexual minorities. Allowing any person, regardless of .sexual
identity or orientation, the right to marry or adopt should have been
the outcome of the Kantarasdecision.
In conclusion, a decision that places burdensome obstacles
on some individuals (transsexuals) but not others (anyone living in
their birth sex) and extends marriage and adoption rights to a
limited few (transsexuals) but not to a greater minority
(homosexuals), should not be celebrated as a victory for the sexual
minority movement.

